watch congress investigates saturday's at 7:00 p.m. eastern on cspan2. correct c-span is your unfiltered view funded by these television companies and more including cox. >> is extremely rare. but friends don't have to beat. be. when you are connected you are not alone. cox supports c-span along with these other television providers. giving it a front receipt to democracy. >> journalist discuss u.s./china relations a potential second cold war as a dialogue conference at georgetown university in washington d.c. they look at how u.s. foreign policy is perceived abroad this is about an hour and a half.

thank you everyone for coming today. i'm thrilled to be with all these wonderful writers. we are going to be talking about the relationship between the united states and china. thinking about that under the paradigm of a second cold war whether that's helpful or not helpful way of looking at that relationship. let me tell you briefly about the people appear. a coldness guardian and author of the book we need new stories it's great to have her here. it is also a writer, a turkish novelist and journalist it's wonderful to have her here.

pakistani novelist the author of many books exit west of the fundamentalist, it's wonderful to have them here. and a historian of the soviet union and the cold war. and a writer at the atlantic. her books include gulags and iron curtain. it's great to have you here. and when we are done you should get in note cards at some point today, some point in the next active questions you can pass on to the end of the aisle. we will read those for the next half-hour of the event. tell me what you think about this idea of cold war 2.0 or second floor with china and specifically how it might look to people are not any nine caesar china? how you think about that idea as we embark on this relationship with china's got more intense the last decade. >> thank you for the kind introduction. so happy to see so many of you here particulate now that this is our last event.

it's great to have you all here. the first thing i would say is even the definition of cold war. even calling it a war in itself is a view from summer quite specific. i have been african perspective on the chinese u.s. relationship. the difference between the two in the way influences spread across the world and how that translates into backing for each party agenda has been very different in africa try to spend a huge amount of time in building strong infrastructure strong cultural connections with the confidence. i remember being about eight or nine years old and members of the chinese embassy coming to school to our children to participate in cultural exchange in china. it is a concerted attempt to

have chinese programs, cultural programs initiated with sudanese egyptian government. the difference between the engagement of china and the u.s. has men's that at our level it's a very urgent and pressing crisis. where their economic interests or wishes china critically draws a lot of influence. a lot of capitol. those areas do not see it like that. they just see china as a benign partner in economic and cultural projects. the benign aspect is the crucial one. because the way china has established these programs in particular big infrastructure projects in africa. a little bit in the near middle

east. they've done it without any political outreach. there is not been any demand or any pressure they follow a chinese agenda on the global stage if that makes sense. contrast that with the way the united states has applied its influence. or have extended its power particular in west africa which is been very aggressive and militarized. lots of troops, lots of military that's not structured or clear which makes it seem quite sinister. there's a lot of marine activity. it's seen as sinister. it's a below the radar. it's seen as having an agenda notice about securitizing africa. and securitizing economic assets

mineral and other assets america wants to protect rather than to be in a partnership with those countries. so in summary, and to answer your question the view of a cold or is very specific it's not as though you reflect on how many other parts of the world see or even engage with that conflict. >> how do you think about the question that i asked? i want to turn to china and africa specifically later on. i'm discursively think about it? what's the cold war cluster. >> yes. the person was not called for my part of the world and for your part of the world as well. agitators were friends pakistan and turkish. my generation are known as pakistani. it was not very cold because we

grew up or i am of the cold war and away. progressives this means the most educated part of the population. excelled, tortured, killed, the loss of jobs, lost their families. it was pretty heated for big part of the population. so now i think it's going to be heated in a nether way. maybe not necessarily for the united states the previous panel was quite interesting in a sense. there was talk about liberalism and ideology. but now it's coming to an end. we often turn to the rest of the world and take the leadership to change this situation and so on.

the first time they took the leadership was during the cold war. there were many military coups in my part of the world one being turkish military. to free market economy. there was a massive labor movements there should have been a coup and now it is kind of interesting to listen to these views. and now we are going to take the leadership again and were going to be very, very amazing in this job. it sounded like the previous panel so wanted to pick up on that a little. that's what i wanted to say.

i think my own personal sense is a new cold war would be a disaster for the world. without spending our energy trying to destroy each other. i grew up at least partially next to the one great battlegrounds of the last cold war. and pakistan next to afghanistan. so i grew up we had a dictator backed by huge amount of u.s. aid. given weaponry he proceeded to quote unquote tearing that much of the social fabric. teaching us that we should support their fight against the soviets. sitting up all these training camps. the expense of that as a child was deceit weaponry flying into

the city. the ak-47. and complete transformation of pakistan national character a great victory was one of the cold war. and they lived happily ever after. i think for me this informs how we view these conflicts. they are almost always completely disastrous. each time we stumble into another one vietnam, afghanistan, it's almost more persuasive.

the autocratic in taiwan is a democracy. it is persuasive. it's completely devastated. mcintyre's of the exercise have a disaster. my sense of desirability of the sort of things. in terms of what is going on i think the moment in the world danger of covid turned out it would not kill us. would have exaggerated immune response. it goes kind of payware in response to a perceived threat

and damaging ourselves. in a sense the united states is script by something like that right now for the nice its establishment looks around the world sees these threats that i think will be devastating for the body of the world. as this progresses how do we not do that becomes very important. i would go on. being skeptical to the degree to which we consider other countries to be our adversaries inherently adversarial the pakistani to be aware of the government. also recognizing a huge population of people who can't cooperate et cetera. similarly for the u.s. the second part of it of course is don't view the threat is quite as threatening as my first

suggestion. the second thing in the last thing i will say is beat much be critical and skeptical. and pakistan we have a corrupt and self-interested national security establishment. so does the united states. i'm old enough by friends of gone and government are doing very wellin their private countries. they legalize corruption by allowing women military related. to preside over massive purchases. go to a private sector. numerous of payments for the people are supposed to regulate. i will stop there but those are my initial reactions. >> is you want to weigh in on this? quick site object to cold war

2.0 on a lot of grounds. first of all i'm not sure who really uses it. i hear it used almost as a provocative frame. i'm not sure who really thanks that way. people are planning to divide the world between american china that is the implication of the phrase you be somehow divided into two spheres like we were in the past. i don't believe the world divides up that easily or that simplistically. i don't think the original cold war it did either. the mistakes and remain the cold war were almost always to do with the u.s. or the other side for the soviet union perceiving enemies and allies when in fact it was more subtle. we are the south vietnamese i am sorry we are self vietnamese alive with united states because they were capitalists.

or for other reasons north vietnamese attack because they are communist or they were nationalists. we allow the world to be divided in these two camps it made an easy frame for people to make judgments and lead to a lot of mistakes that i've had the same is true for the union. maybe even more so. i think there are divisions in the world. i do not agree with you that all enemies and all conflicts are a matter of perception. what we do see are rising is certainly a network on the autocratic side. china, russia, iran, venezuela, zimbabwe, north korea or countries who do work together for there is nothing in common ideologically. they do not meet in secret rooms like in a james bond movie and make decisions about what they should do. it is not a simplistic group.

but it is a group who had some things in common. and one of the things they have in common is their desire to repress their own democratic democraticactivists in their own opposition. and in order to do that they often fight both ideologically and in some cases they can see democratic world. one of the reasons for the russian invasion of ukraine obviously there is a colonial project with russia deciding to re-create an empire but another reason why they are doing it is because the idea that ukraine could become a democracy and could some amount make its own decisions and be aligned with other democracies around the world wasn't ideological challenged to prove pollutant could not let go. if you fail to understand that then you won't understand why the war is being fought.

. >> and the fight against those is just as important as the struggle internationally and at the same time i would agree with you that there are allies to be found on the other side, whether it's the russian opposition or the, you know, the hong kong opposition or the iranian

women's movement. those are allies that if they would work together and people in the democratic world we could achieve things. do i think there's an idealoguic conflict in the world. i hope it would never look like cold war 1.0. >> does anyone want to respond to that or should i? the way you layed it out of this idea of, you know, you have the autocratic countries that are often allied in some way and they collectively pose a challenge to democratic countries. what other countless are more democratic, saudi arabia, india increasingly? >> it does not include every

country. vietnam is another interesting example. vietnam is autocracy, it's not a revisionist power. it doesn't seek to change the world order. it's not trying to take human rights language out of the united nations, for example. you can point to them, you can point to saudi arabia sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other. india you can say it's sometimes aligned one way or another. i'm stressing that it's not a simplistic framework and not every country is into it and not every country fits into it. i'm simply saying that there is network of autocracies who do have as one of their goals oppression of democratic opposition and language of democracy in other places and they have tools of, you know, you can call it information warfare makes it sound too exciting. they have -- they have tools in

which they seek to, you know, spread autocratic narratives, spread the narrative of democratic decline and indicate that's one of their projects. they also seek to preserve kind of, you know, system which allows them to steal and hide money and they do with cooperation of people in europe as well. they also help one another. there's brilliant examples of that. venezuela is a country that probably has an extraordinarily unpopular government that would lose a popular election. partly it's because the autocratic world supports the maduro regime. so the russian sell them weapons and the chinese sell them surveillance technology and also invest in ways that are of assistance and some to have chinese investment around the world may be benign and some of it is directed in such a way

that is of use to dictatorships and that would be one example where that's true. you know, iran plays an extraordinary role in venezuela, there's no historic relationship between iran and venezuela. the only thing they have in common is that they both are interested in oil and they're both interested in getting around sanctions and so they help one another do that. and so -- again, you know, the rescue of the belorussian dictator. that was done mostly russian project but done with the help of others too. they do see one other and they have joint projects and many differences between them as well. >> do you want to -- the question about how other autocratic regimes fall into this. and i appreciate and attempt to

complicate the -- the framing and give it nuance. i think even within that complicating framing, there's more nuance as well. i think i'm struggling get my head around the uniformity of these motivations, right, that they are -- no, no, i'm saying that they have a -- they have a group interest and it's all related to either advancing their own agenda or oppressing their own people and that's also -- iran in particular in this instance, there's also a regional con text to it as well. and -- and one of the difficulties, sort of member, essentially access that is evil

that has no ideology u.s. agenda but also has within regional context absolutely no new dimension. it is a country that -- maybe have broad interest in terms of opposing the u.s. that lock or interlock with the u.s. and with china. there's also a long history in the middle east but long history of religious schism but history with shiites dispersal through arabian peninsula.

just try to give some color as to how the motivations of these countries may man nest broadly as sort of antiu.s., antiwestern force but actually aren't just using the example of iran is a representative and interlock in the region where shiite population and many different countries that have collapsed systems themselves and, therefore, iran becomes -- irani government becomes central force in these local political dynamics. the way people talk about proxy forces in iran is that they are very easily and directly connected to do tehran. the houthis are connected, on the other side of the puppet string or even small tariffs that work in the region as well.

it's not that straightforward. there are influences and desires that marginalized shiite forces in the region and political forces in the region would like to impose or equalize and tehran and iran is the central force in that. the point i'm trying to make that even within that complexity there's even more complexity that means that it is, i think, we should hesitate a little bit to categorize places or countries like iran as purely or even primarily acting on an agenda of democratic suppression and imperial or sort of resistance. there's a regional context and sort of failed states and oppressive governments around as

well. both of you talked about during the cold war coming from countries where u.s. policy, cold war policy by unelected leaders. obviously that was a huge part of the cold war. the cold war also especially in europe was something that many free democratic countries wanted united states support in during. and we see that also with any sort of possible conflict with china that, you know, there's all kinds of things going on in africa and latin america and all over the world but there's also countries in east asia, japan, south korea, democratic countries that want to draw close the other the united states in part because of fear of china, fear of aggressive china and i think most people

would say successful policy, different times during the cold war. i'm wondering how to sort of think about that, how to separate out if we should separate it out democratic countries who want the support, the help of the united states from these aspects of the cold wars that were painful to your countries. >> first of all, there's this word democracy that has been used as a token, signal in the conversations when we are talking about politics, countries, u.s. want to protect democracy against putin and this and that and there's very nuance and complicated -- so on. but then i have to make this point, can we all get real, please? right before putin attacked ukraine zelenskyy was just a

joke. he's now an amazing extraordinary role leader and he's doing amazingly -- i mean, i am stunned but it was -- he was a comedian and his election was the pinnacle of cynicism about democracy. >> sorry, why was his election pinnacle of cynicism? >> he ran a campaign and people elected him and became amazing leader. >> i was there, i don't think people were laughing. you can have different views about what he was doing or how he ran his campaign but i think he had a very specific set of points. he was seek to go appeal to a particular population, mostly

middle, lower-middle class ukrainians especially from the south and east. >> anyway, just keep on. you said during the cold war europe has received help from the united states. >> a lot of aspects to have united states support for western europe during the cold war. >> it came with a price. that's the thing. marshal plan, when marshal aid was brought to europe which was much needed help, it was -- it came with a political price as well. much-needed help. this democracy, from washington,

we are bringing democracy to the other part of the world. of course, they are cynical about it. they are not -- they are not trusting it anymore for historical reasons. this is the last panel -- >> you know, i think i don't really believe in democracy, autocracy distinction. among the democracies that i've been enlisted to contest with china is india. country which is rapidly becoming less democratic. in fact, the population of india is more than all the other countries in alliance of democracies put together. if we are concerned about the number of people that live in democracy in the world and if we look at the effects of the current alliance, i think what we see is that the alliance against china is causing america

to do precisely the same thing it did in pakistan in 1980's which is picking unsavorily partner who is destroying fabric of own country on fighting the enemy of the day. i don't want to go much into autocracy or democracy or russian desire to reestablish empire or chinese desire to do, et cetera, i would like to focus for a minute in the united states and i think perhaps the most useful thing i can do on this panel is to say that it is worth questioning for those who live here the assumption that the united states is fundamentally benign. how do we come to this assumption? was the united states benign in iraq? was the united states benign in afghanistan, was the united states benign in the original afghanistan situation? was it benign interventions in pakistan and turkey all over the world. you know, we sort of pretend, well, america made mistakes in

the past but now we are good. we would never do a -- that's just not who we are. we have learned our lesson. the sad truth for me that america hasn't learned its lesson. i group up with these people and i know folks are serving. you know, there's a theoretical obsession that is utterly avoid from lived experience. i was a mckenzie consultant, you go to these companies and come up with better ways of running them. i enjoy the experience and left it and became novelist, but but i probably learned more about

business advising my wife as she runs her small restaurant in pakistan than i did in all my time as mckenzie consultant. i learned theory, but the reality of things is quite different. the reason i say it's worth questioning whether america is benign because historically america hasn't been. it hasn't been benevolent actor but destroyed lives of hundreds of millions of people, and is i think this idea that i would like to introduce the conversations and idea of humility, we in places like pakistan, we know that our countries aren't fundamentally benign and i'm thinking -- i don't know if i believe this. americans, i think, are much too quick to assume that they are

benign and i would suggest that the rest of the world is not convinced. look at the votes on the important issues. israel, palestine, ukraine, et cetera. the world is not persuaded. and the world is -- >> i'm sorry, the votes in ukraine have been overwhelmingly against russia. >> the russian invasion but not supporting of sanctioning russia and all this sort of stuff, right, and i think there's a reason for that. in america it's understood that, of course, putin wanted to conquer the world and rebuild the russian empire, et cetera. but, you know, i think many people in the world look at america and see it poking, you know, let's poke at russia a little bit, let's poke at china, let's start to pick at the question whether taiwan might declare independent one way. i'm not saying that america is some horrible country. i'm just saying that america makes a lot of mistakes and i

would think it's worthwhile having a much more humble attitude towards foreign policy that says first do no harm, let's not be so certain that we are right in our convictions. i'm not saying that putin is right or china is right. i think around the world only a madman would prefer to live with putin or russia, i'm not saying they are wonderful countries but when i come to america and i hear americans talk about these sorts of issue of foreign policy, i'm baffled by disasters that america has presided and complete conviction that this one will be different. >> may i add something? >> and to frame certain enemies

as uniquely threatening to world order or democracy, it's worth asking does that mean that they are threatening to american security and economic interest or american-european economic interest rather than some sort of abstract values that everyone aligns to because if it is because they they are expansionist, america has expansionist allies because they are ideological or pretend to be ideological america has allies that are extremely ideological, because they don't have democracy, we know america is very close to regimes ethically supremacist. i'm trying to tease out the moral and value basis upon which we should view these threats

cold war and no cold war and you will see contradictions. there was a vote in the united nations when russia invaded ukraine. sanctions and -- and money laundering laws but then you have the weird anomalies which show you that this is actually interlocking interest that align with america that do not because one to have largest russian money laundering operations in the world is one of america's closest allies which the united states arab emirates. neither america nor europe want to sanction the uae or punish them in any way because it is a security and economic ally of the u.s. in that region. we are all alarmed by expansionist regimes and regimes

that use social media and propaganda to undermine elections and democratic enterprises across the world. we are only uniquely alarmed by when they track past on american interest uniquely evil and threatening to the rest of us. original point of benignness which china is perceived and africa as opposed to the united states. did you want to say something? >> i mean, there have been several things that i'm -- that spark my curiosity. i mean, what is the benign do no harm policy for the united states and benign foreign policy

or is it to help ukrainian defends themselves. and i spent half of my time poland, finland and invasion of ukraine was felt as an immediate threat and danger and people understood that if russia wins the war of russia is able to consolidate along the border that, you know, there's an immediate military threat to us. and we are, you know, we are -- we are supposed toly american allies, so, you know, this is your cold war scenarios so we had we have a number of countries that wanted very much for the united states to help ukraine, not the fight. hopefully we won't get to that, but they did want them to help, so what is the benign humble do

no harm attitude should they have said, we are not touching this conflict, you work it out, what are you saying? >> actually there's quite a lot of human ill any the city and there's a lot of people who don't think we should do anything. so i don't think we live anymore if we ever did in the united states where unanimously everybody is in favor of intervening everywhere and there's a lot of passion for going to war. i think actually we live in a different moment. the statement there's a lot of humility as they conduct policy in the world would be, it's a statement that we regarded as almost preposterous.

>> how many washingtonians do you know? >> everybody in the room may be humbled except for me. what should america do? >> what's the benign policy? >> first humble thing to do is don't start the clock, don't start on october 7th. they have been attacked. 12 people have been massacred. >> let's stick to ukraine. >> i'm going to respond properly to your argument. i would like to have two seconds. if you think of what george, what many other americans thoughts about it, the question is the movement of nato closer and closer to the border of russia likely to make these

countries and the united states more secure or less. >> incredibly secure for 30 years. >> great, great. >> now, the question is, you know, we can look at this in one of two ways, some one say it's a good idea, i would look at it from the standpoint of what happened to ukraine. let us say that america was correct in saying that ukraine should be a member of nato. >> america never said ukraine should be a member of nato. there was no nato decision to -- >> i didn't say ukraine has become. i meant to say in the future, the future tense that one day ukraine ought to become a member of nato. it should be invited to become a member of nato. you would agree that has been said? >> yeah. it was ukraine --

>> exactly. now, has this policy made ukraine safer? i don't know. you might argue, yes, this has been fantastic for ukraine. >> if ukraine were a member of nato it would have been safer. i think we can agree on that. >> i don't know. i would -- >> maybe we don't want to get down this road. >> i think that -- i think that we should look at what happens so this evolved over time. i think it was a mistake to take nato up to the russian border but what do i know i'm not some more expert than any of you. let us remember to come back to the question in five years time. let us look at what has happened to ukraine and let us not let ourselves off the hook. if there are a million dead

ukrainian men and women if the country is devastated by war and if ukraine looks the way afghanistan looks now, let us then have the humility to say that we were wrong. >> and whose fault would that have been? the other is russia can occupy ukraine and then there would be a million dead and concentration camps and so on. >> look, i think that -- i think that let's look at these u.s. interventions in different countries. if they tend to produce destroyed countries with millions of dead people let us say that perhaps -- why is the u.s. helping ukraine defend itself? so you're blaming the u.s. for what's happening to ukraine and not russia? >> no, i'm not blaming the u.s. for this happening in ukraine. but i think from my standpoint i do think that it was a colossal

blunder on the part of the u.s. to push to russian border. when you say the russian view, i think the simple thing differently and in my case i do. i'm not -- i think that many members of the political establishment also believe it was a bad idea. maybe he was, i don't know. what i'm saying is that -- is that if ukraine is devastated by this war -- >> probably will. >> could we have done something differently. that's all i'm trying to say. and i think that we should ask those questions. >> i think -- just to go back to the issue of point of timing and history. if you feel like it is a different moment now and there's a lot more humility in this city

and not affect or chills american interventionism, it's not coincidence. years of foreign policy blunders that have produced neither liberation, freedom or prosperity

so i sympathize with you at this moment in time. >> we are going take some questions from students. i want to ask you both said something which i thought was interesting which was that you talked about how people in other areas of the world perceive the united states and perceive china but what you haven't quite said is that you yourself feel that way. you sort of talked about how you

said -- that the u.s. is poking the bear, whatever it is. you talked about how china was perceived in africa and it was sometimes more positively than you might see. neither of you have said this is sort of my take on how things are going. you sort of talked about perception and i'm curious is there a distinction there and if so, what is it. are you trying to analyze -- >> perception is important whether my perception is not important but the perception of -- >> well, you're on the panel. somewhat important. >> perception of other's people perception. one of the notable things after russian invasion of ukraine was that african countries were not marshaled to vote against the war and apart from 3, 4 american

allies and -- and israeli allies after the israel-gaza war began, it became very clear that america's inability to create good will and to forge strong connections with these countries and russia's ability to do that via some sinister means and funding -- by mercenaries, by gold and minerals, trade between these countries have much more tactile and more relationship with these countries. whatever you may think of that, that has an effect when it gets to the united nations and these countries do not vote and not just the practical backing but the moral backing for your position. what we are talking about now, keeps bringing me back to the point that there's a global opinion, there's a global opinion that matters not just to give you arguments moral value

but to give them the backing that allows you to mobilize huge amounts of money and arms and troops to enact your agenda and that is less an -- america is lens and less able to do that because of these perceptions and china just to come back to my original answer, china is years ahead of the united states in that effort in the global south and particularly in africa. were we lost our faith in political action thanks to the interventionist policies of the united states. i don't know if you remember. i was one to have spokesperson in turkey and the entire world

on the same day we went onto the streets to say no to war but then colin powell dangled and said there was nuclear weapons in baghdad and going to bombard it and suddenly bombardment started. it's a generation of people actually. if you look at it from a certain perspective, a generation of people lost its faith of the united nations or the reminiscence of the face, like what happened there. after the cold war there was no cold war we as humanity since second world war put together a system and we decided to more more humane, more dignified and

this and that, more just and then humanities all that, you know, word suddenly, you know, dangling and then it's good. this actually broke people, now, you're talking about ukraine. we did the essence declaration right after russia started the war and said that we want peace so on and so forth and so said that's a joke, i'm the cute face in that picture. how did we come to this? >> no, how did we come from the

entire world going onto the streets wanting peace to this situation where there was -- i don't know if you remember, there was nobody saying no to war or let's make peace. everybody who was supposed to say no to war was actually siding with u.s. policy mainly and saying that let's kill putin, let's kill more russian soldiers so on and so forth. we are talking about what cold world did to the world or what a second cold war can to do the world. the first one, i think, ruined the face in humanities on a global scale. i find it really interesting what -- not interesting, inspiring and important what american people and american youth is doing today because what they are doing is actually

wanting peace for everybody and wanting dignity for everybody. it is better to listen to them rather than talking about this politic power because i think that kind of thinking brought us here. >> i want to turn to a couple of questions. this is a student question and we've talked about sort of democracies and autocracies a little bit. the question is what extent u.s.-china divide oppose today economic rivalry and we haven't discussed about this and it is interesting that that really hasn't come up at all to what degree playing out in the rest of the world is add ideological divide large part of this as opposed to the question says economic rivalry, does anyone want to try and answer that? >> it's not hard to say that it's both. the economic rivalry is clear and we don't have to get into

the details of it. you know, i think until -- until very recent -- relatively recently wrong there was exactly exactideological rivalry. it is true that xi jinping coming to power in 2013 famously made document parrels facing communist and one is constitutional democracy, one is media freedom, he made clear that for him and i think this was mostly about internal threats so he thought that these -- there are particular ideas that he thought were, you know, a challenge to the chinese communist party and he felt they had to be fought back against and so his rise and his, you know, his replacing to have previous chinese elites i think has created a lot more ideological conflict than there was in the past but, you know, i don't think it's hard to say

that that both are -- are important and sort of almost depends which day of the week and which argument we are talking about. >> how africa's position as strategic battleground for u.s. and china -- >> the whole panel on its own. so it's -- one of the things that has become not just vis-a-vis china but russia as well is that there is -- there are huge mineral and resources in africa that can be used to hedge against global sanctions and i think if you're going to

take it in terms of -- >> a place of porous borders, islamic terrorism or broadly divested from the places, sudan and in the north. and so there has been a real -- in that time a real expansion on the part of china and russia in countries that have become huge particularly to russia at this moment in terms of offering economic support and even just sort of physical areas for

russian money to be stored and for russian figures, actual members to have group and to be housed and the chinese are a little bit different but essentially have the same empowering element to it which is that it is a place that china can make a lot of money and it can make a lot of money in sectors that are linked to the elite in these countries. china is not like a mom and pop shop in africa. it's huge highway infrastructure agriculture projects dams that are linked to military and political elites in the country that make their alliances far more crucial to their own fate than it would be for other country. if it did come down to it, whatever that looks like, political elites and african countries which china has large investments, large

infrastructure alliances are much more likely to gogo with the country that literally has built expressways in which they are still paying loans or paying off the loans to than the country your closest relationship is the military base down the road. >> or asking the perception of the west and how can we ally with civil society in these countries. my sense is that i would prefer that america did much less and pakistan, for example, you know, the cause of democracy and has

been enormously set back. i think by -- by america's engagement with pakistan. my own sense is that i spent the 1970's in california. i went to a public elementary school. my father is university professor during ph.d and the public elementary school i went to in california was so much better than best private school that it boggled the mind, you know. i couldn't write and there was like this kid in gibberish, my handwriting was poor, inverting letters and they put me in a separate room and figured it out. 70's now. they are like, okay, block print, you know, and if i hadn't had that kind of intervention i probably wouldn't be a novelist

today. i tell you the story because the good public schools in california today are not better than the best schools in pakistan. my parents, my dad registered, my mom commuted to a job in redwood city with secondhand dodson and yet we live quite an opulant life. parks, weekends, we never seem to want more money, mother's colleague entry level person, lowest level in a tech company that made audio cassettes. she bought a house in the bay area. now, i suppose where i'm going with this is to say that america's interventions are not

for america. my own attachment to this country is such that i actually think that america desperately needs to focus on the united states. these interventions are very often disastrous, they are complicated. but i think the net result of america's highly foreign policy focus, policy focus has been the impoverishment of america and when you say isolationist, it's such an interesting word. if america were to conduct itself the way that almost every other country on planet earth conducts itself which primarily concerned about itself with some interventions abroad, like that's not isolationist, that's how countries are. the only country that isn't like that, a couple of countries maybe but the one -- the large country that's most not like is the united states. i would say this that's in a lot of interventions we don't know if it's good or evil.

i believe the best intentions that why america went to afghanistan, iran, i'm saying the results are disastrous. i think if we were to instead take those resources and put them into this country america would be such a more powerful force, empowered working class, less of these turmoils and the last thing i will say about this is when i went to law school, i wasn't a u.s. citizen so i had to have my loans cosigned by an american. cosign a hundred thousands dollars of high school loans in 1990's. it was vietnam. he didn't go to vietnam. he volunteered to serve and later thought it was a mistake. he would pick me up at the

airport and he would talk about how it was so strange that a war was happening right now and it looks like nothing is going on, like there's no protest, there's no nothing. america is at war but it doesn't affect anybody. now, what i want to conclude with this saying but it did affect people, lost friends who suffered unbelievable trauma who came back and why did we go and fight the wars and who said the elite of this country have no concern for our interest, they don't care about us, we don't believe in this system, we reject this. if we don't know how successful interventions are and we have a choice of putting these

resources into the american people, i would say put in the american people. i'm reading between the lines a little bit. i thought the questioner was asking in part not so much about military interventionists but sort of how the united states should rhetorically or otherwise support something like the women's movement to iran and it seems like what you were saying is that, well, perhaps two things that one, the united states tends to get involved on the wrong side of these things or often does and perhaps not get involved in any way at all which is fine, it's perfectly reasonable answer, but my question sort of which someone else can maybe take -- >> i want to tell anecdote from turkey. of course, when america supports those things, within the domestic context it becomes, wow, there's america behind this. so that's a problematic --

problematic situation for the people on the ground but then there's the other side of the coin which is actually nice for you guys. in 2013 there was this big uprising in turkey against erdogan. everyone was on the streets, the process spent the entire country. it was a massive carnival, it was a revolutionary moment and so on and you know what, i remember the movement, the cnn started the live airing like live broadcasting, that was like, wow, they saw us. it was, you know, it's not only united states but also the united states is now amplifying the word for the rest of the world. >> so -- and i see the beauty behind this question and that's why i'm answering in this way.

if people in america want to support the people of the world, they just have to look at them and make them -- that's it. there's nothing else that they are asked for if they want to come with the people, that's also okay. >> i will ask anne this one, how do you think a second term presidency might impact our relationship with china going forward? >> it's a surprisingly difficult question to answer. when he says jump a million people jump. i can't remember the exact quote but something along those lines. i like it if my people would do that too, something classic like

that. so, you know, i can imagine a world in which he would seek to do personal deals with china in which he would hope that business people around and who support him would have special relationships with china. he's -- he's a transactional person and transactional president with really -- no values that bother him, none of the ideology that bothers people is attached to him at all so he might seek relationships with china that would be finally advantageous to him and his friends. if he saw that it was useful for him politically to be anti-china, if there was -- if he could create a popular move the united states against china, if that language and rhetoric would be helpful to him, i can imagine him taking that route as well as he has done in the past. so in the case of trump, you

don't ask, you know, it's not a question about ideology or politics, it's a question of what in the given moment he would perceive as good for him and that would be, that would be chinese are -- are, you know, their messaging against him and so son, what they think i can't even imagine but he opportunity represent a kind of well thought out political view, you know, that n which we can -- we can see what would happen down the line. it will depend what he decides is good for him. >> what is the book recommendation each of you would make for students or future policymakers who are interested in u.s. foreign policy? >> i will let you each think about that for a couple of minutes if you want, we will get back to it. >> but, you know, i want to just

ask another question here just looking at these questions which is that to what degree, i think, that in the united states itself trump's election was seen as this earthquake obviously and obviously it was around the world to some extent too but to what extent do you think in terms of the way the united states is viewed from especially the three of you who have offered up the way the united states is viewed in the world is negatively predating trump. do you think it changed something, trump coming back in four years, you know, american policy ricocheting or not so much? >> less gaza. i think this is what people expected the trump presidency to have but actually gaza is what achieved this. i'm speaking very broadly here

obviously when i think about middle east and not africa in particular. the view that american foreign policy is at best evil at worst but always coherent, right, always coherent, always coordinated, always intelligent. when things went wrong like an iraq it was the kind of unintended consequence and blunder of this mighty force that miscalculated. after gaza, and it hasn't helped having a president such as joe biden at the helm, just because it has sort of lack of articulatey and inability to come with the grips with the crisis. america does not know what it's doing which is all together far more dangerous, i think, because you can respect that you think you disagree with that you think has a huge amount of

intelligence, whatever that intelligence is. but after gaza it is seen as inherently contradictory unable to pursue the main thing that american foreign pollsy touts as differentiating which is desire to create stability, security and peace. it has not been able to deliver peace. it's not been able to deliver security, it's not been able to marshal its ally israel to a peaceful resolution. that is very undermining of america's power and it has not been able even to articulate a coherent moral framing for what is happening, so the perception has changed to one of sort of grudging, not respect, but understand, powerful country and it needs to do what it needs to do to maintain its power and its interest to you have so much power that there's something

crumbling about it, something slightly last days of empire about it all because the logic of this power seems not to hold and n this particular instance. so disrespect, mockery and kind of emperor's new clothes type perception that i'm sensing in the middle east. >> is playing the big puppet. this is the general perception. oh, the united states. they don't know what they are doing. this is a perception for sure in turkey. several other countries. >> it's incredible. i would agree with what you said. nothing has been quite like this. i mean, the idea that some country that is recipient of so much u.s. aid seems to have power vis-a-vis the united states that, in fact, the president or prime minister of

other country, foreign country can be invited to address the u.s. congress in opposition to the president of the united states of america is an utterly baffling site. >> this is during obama administration. >> i think that -- i think that the u.s.-israel relationship particularly on the issue of gaza, it seems that it is detrimental to the u.s. and yet the u.s. is so helpless. biden is unable to do anything, to figure out what is the american interest, what might america do. those that are old enough we remember, i think it was 1982 when reagan threaten to do cut off the supply and reagan was no peace maker but biden is secretly getting 2,000-pound bombs to israel and people are

resigning in the state department, aggregate all of our own things and it conveys the impression of a state of profound corruption, moral corruption, societal corruption. and you can say america should be doing this, but, you know, without taking sides on where you think the israel-palestine conflict should end up, but on the massacre that we have been seeing for the last several months, i think this has really turned people off, you know, off the united states, not just in terms of it being the right policy but in the idea that the u.s. government perhaps doesn't really represent the will of the people or even have the capacity to act in u.s. self-interest. .. ..

its allies in the global political system. broadly it is a stabilizing factor. the fact it has been unable to bring that and security. while also allowing, this is so damaging. while allowing the israeli authorities to speak to america and to the icj into the global human rights community. in such a manner the lesson heard that kind of language spoken you're going to let them talk to you like that? that has been not just detrimental to how america is perceived as a coherent stabilizing force but they are immoral or a moral. but to a global justice system and language of international

values and principles that as i think far more dangerous than what's happening to america at the moment. there's always agitating forces that we start this conversation with on russia and china. this is their currency for this is what they do. this is the threat, the biggest threat they seem to pose as they undermine the very fragile post-world war ii of checks and balances. you have a central ally at the u.s. doing so. i only receiving no censure lots of support. as a threat of a cold war or extending group that are in the ascendance. it is because there are inherent contradictions in how america treats its allies.

more ability, more ground, or me traction because of america's inconsistencies. >> can i ask you a question about sandwiches junior first answer talked about the two groupings of countries. >> that's exactly it is not saying pink work's not about china you talked about photography joining together. >> the network extends into other places as well. rex and many of that group i guess maybe group is the wrong word. may be of those countries you've mentioned have taken the opposite position they've taken on ukraine and rhetorically have tried to use that against the u.s. and its allies to say essentially we are setting up for human rights at the un security council and so on and so forth while the u.s. and allies is not. curious what you made of that? that comp locates a picture in some way or there's a base level of these how do you view it?

>> baselevel cynicism. [laughter] there is clearly criticism there. grix i just had a conversation china expert writes a lot about china he just written a book partly about chinese media and africa. the attitudes that middle east was hands off. we don't really get involved here. we don't take sides. there is an instance 180 degrees turn. that's expression used we can use this. we can make use of it. >> only phrase at this within. taken as a given xi jinping and viner putin didn't care about human rights. >> is that concern you our

policy is allowing them to use this to the advantage? >> yes of course. >> it is a disaster. [inaudible] >> we are not allowed to do that. you can write one down. [inaudible] [inaudible] i am curious your point of view on that.

and it's always. [inaudible] [inaudible] executed 20 million variety. [inaudible] i am curious to hear your point of view what you don't believe perhaps the united states should try to salvage relations. [inaudible] if you can explain that, thank you. quick sure, go for it.

if it is like take this or you die, that is bad. my country has been through two coos. i was born after one ministry who and then when i was eight there is another. both of them were supported by u.s. parenthesis documented. this is not my opinion. so many people die before being my mother she was imprisoned. she was an licit and my father rescued her and they married and so on. so i come from that kind of background. and then it's not only turkey. the united states unfortunately not as its people but it's government applied this policy.

so they made more. they wanted less socialists they wanted more dictatorship. it may be too far away but happened in america as well. many, many, many people died. it was a painful history for us. it's just you don't know as much as we do for that is a painful part of the divide of our story. i wish we could have told more. i wish you could have listened more. this is the story behind my reaction or my assessment. >> are going to have to end there. a couple of minutes tom they're going to stick around for a couple reflections of the

festival itself. but before we go did anyone come up with an answer to that question about a book for young students to read? >> i have one. >> 13 days in september by lawrence wright. it was very useful to me in humanizing all sides. the u.s. intention, the israeli intention and the palestinian intention. i don't think everything happened today but it's a good reminder that it is possible. and it might be possible again one day. >> i do not remember the name of the writer but it's a broken promises. in google it broken promises cold war. you'll see the book it's an amazing book. it was a broken promise. >> i would suggest beloved.

it's foreign policy text. what is incredible about that book is that looks at this horrific history of slavery. it took place in the democracy that was the united states. and reveals the absolute inspiring capacity that can exist in your society to confront mistakes. to be self-critical. and to produce truly transformative insights from that process. that radical self-criticism and inspiration is what i like to see. >> i wrote a book about this. i'm not 1988 ministry the time it was published in the united states. so i recommend that as well. [laughter] >> tempted as i am to recommend my own book which is being published in july. [laughter] it's called hypocrisy is

describes the frame i was trying to -- and i'm probably trying to weakly explain. in addition to that it's a great book if you want to understand how russia sees the world. help other dictatorships do. everything's true impossible by peter. >> thank you guys so much. so glad we did this. thank you everyone for coming to the festival. [applause] ♪ c-span's "washington journal" and live a form of involvement you to discuss the latest issues and government, politics and court policy. from washington d.c. and across

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